



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 15

What Are Nasser's Objectives?

by Georgiana G. Stevens

A basic cleavage between the conservative "haves" ruling in the Arab oil countries and the revolutionary "have nots" has been sharply exposed since the creation of the United Arab Republic (UAR) on February 22 first broke up the existing Middle East political pattern. The republic, with its emphasis on a neutralist and socialist program for a united Arab world, emerged at once as a challenge to old-fashioned monarchies, particularly Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The horizontal structure of Arab society was never more apparent than in the popular pro-UAR demonstrations which took place as far afield as Kuwait. To the angry, half-educated young Arabs who fill coffeehouses and oil towns, UAR seemed to mean emancipation and enfranchisement.

The symbolic value of UAR, more than its actual potentialities, makes it a threat to the oil kingdoms and to Jordan, also ruled by a king. UAR represents the "have nots," whose only share in Arab oil wealth is transit fees, either through the Suez Canal or through pipelines. Yet it has raised hopes and expectations of a better life and a new status for the *fellahin* (peasants) in the village and the slum dwellers in the city, who can no longer be

ignored. It is UAR's socialist intentions rather than its military potential which provide the real challenge to the regimes in Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia.

King Hussein of Jordan at once recognized his heightened vulnerability and enlisted Iraq in the creation of the rival Arab Federation. What remains to be seen is whether this prompt political reorganization is sufficient to distract discontented Iraqis, Jordanians and Palestinians in Jordan from the appeal of UAR. The problem for the federation is, in fact, how to provide an effective alternative and so preserve the authority and prestige of more conservative Arab leadership.

The government of Iraq has been the first of the oil kingdoms to demonstrate a sense of responsibility with regard to the great wealth it derives from oil. Massive drainage and flood control works are being followed now by developments that "show," like schools, hospitals, roads and housing. Industrialization and technical education are being pushed to help complete the physical transformation of the country. What lags is social and political evolution, a sharing of responsibility. However, the inclusion in Iraq's new cabinet of a re-

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formist finance minister, Abdul Kereem al-Uzri, seems to indicate awareness of this lag. To give one example, Uzri has been trying for years to put through legislation that would tax landowners on a more than token basis.

Other domestic anxieties appear to have impelled Iraq toward federation with Jordan. By federation Iraq signified its genuine concern for Arab unity, its desire not to be isolated by reason of its membership in the Baghdad pact, of which it is the only Middle Eastern member. And, very important, Iraq, for the first time, accepted financial responsibility for its "have not" cousins.

Nasser's Gamble

The real significance of the Arab Federation and its possible threat to UAR lies in this potential economic relationship. If Jordanians are able in the months ahead to get cheaper kerosene and meat; if a refinery actually goes up and the phosphate industry grows with Iraqi help, the federation will have introduced something new in the Arab world. The decision rests, of course, with Baghdad, which must soon determine whether to become Jordan's banker, and so give real substance to the federation. This decision will determine whether the conservatives can answer the revolutionaries in a convincing way and so meet the insistent challenge of UAR propaganda.

Meanwhile, Nasser seems to be gambling that the "haves" will not be able to meet that challenge. During his visit to Damascus he pulled

out all the stops against the federation, accusing it of being the instrument of "imperialism." Forgotten is his first congratulatory message to King Faisal on the "blessed step" toward unity, sent when Nasser believed the federation meant Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad pact.

In Damascus the triumph of the Ba'ath party overshadows the real divisions over UAR within Syria. Syria's federation with Egypt represents a chance for this non-Communist leftist group to carry out a program of socialism at home and neutralism abroad. The Ba'ath originated in the philosophy of a young Syrian teacher, Michel Aflaq, a Christian, who had been educated at the Sorbonne, and who in 1940 started a small minority party. One of his early colleagues was the Moslem scholar, Salah el-Bitar, now minister of state in UAR.

In 1952 the Ba'ath was enlarged to include followers of a young socialist editor, Akram Hourani, from Hama in Syria. Hourani had crusaded for improvement of the lot of the fellahin in that rich agricultural region. The coalition then became the Ba'ath Socialist Resurrectionist party, dedicated to social revolution on a nationalist basis. Hence its opposition to the Communist movement in the Levant. They insist that theirs is the only true Arab revolutionary leadership.

A natural affinity of the Ba'ath with Egypt's revolutionary government has been developing since 1955, when Nasser, at the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung, showed his in-

creasing interest in ideological neutralism. This affinity grew stronger in 1957 when Nasser began to move cautiously toward a more broadly based constitutional government. In the UAR the Ba'ath provides a much needed civilian influence to balance the preponderance of military figures who run Egypt. Syria, moreover, offers a place where some of Egypt's unemployed may ultimately find jobs and living space. But in spite of its relative prosperity Syria can give Egypt little economic help. UAR must look elsewhere to balance its present dependence on Soviet-bloc aid. Under the circumstances, it looks most hopefully to its oil-rich neighbors.

Yet UAR's socialistic program, and Nasser's demagogic appeals over the heads of governments to the Arab peoples, understandably alarm the oil countries' governments. By attacking King Saud, for example, Nasser has helped to undermine his position and raise sufficient doubts so that the more modern-minded element led by Prince Faisal and sympathetic to Egypt have gained the ascendancy in Saudi Arabia. Faisal, in turn, will now be challenged to help the UAR or be attacked by it, for beneath all the voluble emotion over political unity is the realization that the new Arab revolt directed against both poverty and alien entanglements can succeed only if Arab oil wealth is behind it.

Mrs. Stevens, an associate of Middle East Research Associates, has lived and worked in the Middle East and has written frequently on that area for the *Middle East Journal* and the *FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN*.

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347

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Dr. Libby's Earth-Shaking Story

This article has to do with what I am persuaded is the most enthralling and fantastic story in this infant atomic-age. It concerns the results, prospects and potentials of underground atomic plants. It comes from Chairman Willard F. Libby of the Atomic Energy Commission and is based on his account of what happened last September when the United States exploded "a tiny A-bomb" inside a mountain near Las Vegas, Nevada.

The mountain literally jumped six inches. The blast was detected 2,000 — not 250 as first reported — miles away. There was no dangerous radioactive fallout of any kind. The blast turned 400,000 tons of rock into powder. It trapped an unmeasured quantity of heat and gaseous products in an immense molten bubble—heat that could be turned into steam, and radioactive gases that could be turned into radio isotopes for use in medicine and industry.

What underground atomic blasts may be able to do in the future, Dr. Libby could only suggest, but this was breath-taking: they could move mountains, open up new sources of oil wealth and water resources, create harbors, in fact remake the face of the earth and bring incalculable benefits to man—to all mankind, Russians as well as Americans, Communists as well as capitalists.

Dr. Libby's story has tremendous political, as well as economic, significance. Some United States atomic scientists, in the world-wide debate over banning nuclear tests, have been arguing that underground tests could not be detected with any assurance and that therefore the Russians could "cheat" on any international

agreement to end testing. The Nevada test does not prove the contrary, but it does suggest that it would be very difficult to "cheat" even underground. This could make the United States more willing to forego testing if the abandonment of tests could result in some disarmament agreement with the U.S.S.R.

The Blast and Nuclear Tests

But this blast could possibly have just the opposite effect. Instead of advancing the prospect of a test ban it could end talk of such a ban, or at least the kind of a ban the Russians have been urging. For what this shows is that some tests, underground at least, can be tremendously beneficial to man. Thus this underground blast has pointed up the vast and unlimited potential of the peaceful uses of controlled testing. It has shown that the banning of all tests (the Russians have so far made no distinction between above-ground and underground tests) could mean incalculable loss to mankind, to industrial development, to the national economy of the U.S.S.R. as well as of the United States. With this disclosure of the potentials from underground blasts for peace and economic progress, it is not impossible that the underdeveloped nations of the world, many of which are neutralist, will come around to supporting the United States position on nuclear testing.

Actually, American industry is already moving toward participation in atomic blasts, whose potentials it has promptly realized. The first application of the underground A-bomb will probably occur in the oil industry. Three oil companies are now negotiating with the A.E.C. on techniques

to free oil deposits that are now inaccessible. Oil men see great possibilities for the use of atomic explosions, among them, squeezing trapped oil from depleted pools by heat and pressure; squeezing oil out of oil shale; and using explosions to loosen up "tar sands" of big deposits like those in Canada where oil is too thick to flow.

The mining industry is also exploring the possibilities of underground atomic blasts to turn up new veins of ore. The United States government itself is already studying ways of using atomic blasts to create great natural water reservoirs, to unlock the wealth of vast arid areas, to dig deep harbors where none existed before.

The A.E.C. has named its program to use subterranean explosions for peaceful purposes, "Project Plowshare." Thus the modern equivalent of the sword is turned into the modern counterpart of the plow. For the moment Washington opinion on the nuclear test ban issue is in flux. The Libby testimony suggests that an international agreement on banning tests could be policed with considerable success. But the Nevada test results indicate that at least underground testing should go on. Out of these conflicting views could well come some kind of agreement that open-air testing of weapons should halt but that underground testing should continue. The only prospect of selling such a scheme to both the U.S.S.R. and the United States, it would seem, would be to put the whole subject of testing under some form of United Nations control.

NEAL STANFORD



Should U.S. Continue Foreign Aid?

Dwight D. Eisenhower

WHAT is the present function of mutual aid?

As our mutual aid programs have shifted from meeting post-war emergencies to building the long-range basis for peace, the scene of operations has shifted. Our technical and economic aid is now concentrated heavily in the newly developing countries of Asia and Africa. Throughout large parts of these continents vast reserves of human energy are opening up in a way that has not happened for centuries.

This poses a blunt question. Is this tremendous force to become funneled into violence, rioting, destruction of orderly government, and Communist exploitation? Or will this force be channeled into producing better education, wider sharing of prosperity, improved health and living standards, and greater freedom, self-determination and self-respect? Is our goal a just and permanent peace or is it just a precarious security built on arms alone?

If you wonder why there is so much restlessness in such places as the Middle East, South Asia and the Far East, look at a single figure.

Over a large part of this area the average individual has 20 cents a day to live on.

Some ask: "Hasn't this been true for centuries? Why then is it suddenly such a problem?"

One reason is that most of the countries involved have recently become independent. The world has seen 20 new countries born since World War II. With independence

and with greater knowledge of the outside world there has been a new hope and a new determination to have a better life.

In these countries the trained Communist agent is always present, trying to make Communist capital out of this normal and healthy dissatisfaction with needless poverty.

In the last few years the Communists have added a new technique: blocked in their efforts to use military force for expansion, they have turned to offers of economic loans and credits—and this in spite of their own low standard of living at home. They are trying to imitate a valuable and needed program we began ten years ago.

There is a vast difference, however, between the purpose of Russian loans and credits and the purpose of our economic aid. The Soviet Union wants to gain economic, and ultimately political, control of the countries she pretends to help. We, on the other hand, want these countries to stand on their own feet as proud, robust friends and partners with whom we can live in mutual respect. Improved agriculture and industry raise living standards and give more and more people a solid stake in peace. Improved education brings a greater political stability and international understanding. Improved health cuts down poverty and misery which are well-known breeding-grounds for disorder and communism. My friends, if we are to find the world we seek, we must catch the vision of the neighborhood of the world. When we have done this, all such measures as mutual security

Experienced Washington observers predict hard sledding for President Eisenhower's \$3.9 billion foreign-aid program. Here are excerpts from addresses given at the conference on Foreign Aspects of United States National Security in Washington on February 25 by President Eisenhower and Adlai E. Stevenson, as printed in the New York *Herald Tribune* on February 26. These speeches reveal agreement between the leaders of the Republican and Democratic parties on the need to continue foreign aid.

will seem as natural and logical—or as necessary to our own good—as our activities for community prosperity, health and education seem now.

Success Depends on Citizens

... my fellow Americans, the action I would like to ask of you is simple. It is your fullest support of the pending programs of mutual military and economic aid.

Success in these fields, as always in a democracy, depends on you.

It depends on the fullest understanding by every American of the importance of these programs to our country, as well as an understanding of the hopes and needs and views of our friends overseas. It depends not only on what we are willing to give, but on what we are willing to receive and learn from others. It depends on our realization of the indispensable role played by mutual aid to produce a safe and peaceful world.

And remember this: as our aid program goes forward with your support, people all over the world will know that it is not a maneuver carried out by a dictator—rather it is an expression of good will and basic common sense coming from the voluntary act of a free people.

This is no time for short-sighted narrowness. The array of leaders of both parties who have come together here today is eloquent proof that on this issue partisanship has indeed taken a holiday. The urgency of the times and the opportunity before us call for greatness of spirit transcending all party considerations.

The tasks of building and sustain-

(Continued on page 118)

Continuance of foreign aid, however, is opposed from several quarters, among them *The Wall Street Journal*, which has published a number of editorials favoring foreign trade in preference to foreign aid. One of the most outspoken critics of foreign aid is former United States Ambassador George F. Kennan, whose remarks on this subject in a Reith lecture delivered over the British Broadcasting Corporation and published in *The Listener* (London) on December 12, 1957, are excerpted here.

George F. Kennan

THE demands frequently made upon us by the independent countries of the world seem to me to run something like this: "We," they say, "are determined to have economic development and to have it at once. For us, this is an overriding aim, an absolute requirement; and we are not much concerned about the method by which it is achieved. You in the West owe it to us to let us have your assistance and to give it to us promptly, effectively, and without conditions; otherwise we will take it from the Russians, whose experience and methods we suspect anyway to be more relevant to our problems."

In response to this approach, a great many people in my own country have come to take it for granted that there is some direct relationship between programs of economic aid on the one hand and political attitudes on the other—between the amount of money we are willing to devote to economic assistance in any given year and the amount of progress we may expect to make in overcoming these troublesome states of mind I have been talking about.

This thesis, as well as the reaction to it at home, seems to me to be questionable at every point. I find myself thrown off at the very start by this absolute value attached to rapid economic development. Why all the urgency? It can well be argued that the pace of change is no less important than its nature, and that great damage can be done by altering too rapidly the sociological and cultural

structure of any society, even where these alterations may be desirable in themselves. In many instances one would also like to know how this economic progress is to be related to the staggering population growth with which it is associated. Finally, many of us in America have seen too much of the incidental effects of industrialization and urbanization to be convinced that these things are absolute answers to problems anywhere, or that they could be worth any sacrifice to obtain. For these reasons I cannot fully share the basic enthusiasm on which this whole thesis is founded. . . .

I can well understand that there are instances in which it will be desirable for us from time to time to support schemes of economic development which are soundly conceived, which give promise, over the long run, of yielding greater stability and a new hopefulness for the countries concerned. I trust that we will not let such demands go unanswered when they arise. There is no fonder hope in the American breast, my own included, than that the experience we have had in developing a continent will prove relevant and helpful to others. Every American would like to see us take a useful part in solving problems of economic development elsewhere in the world. But action of this sort can be useful only if it proceeds on a sound psychological basis. If there is a general impression in the recipient countries that American aid represents the paying of some sort of a debt from us to them, then the extension of it can only sow confusion. The same is true if it is going

to be interpreted as a sign of weakness on our part or of a fear that others might go over to the Communists, or if it is going to be widely attacked in the recipient countries as evidence of what the Communists have taught people to refer to as "imperialism," by which they seem to mean some sort of intricate and concealed foreign domination, the exact workings of which are never very clearly explained.

Unless such reactions can be ruled out, programs of economic aid are apt to do more harm than good, psychologically; and it ought properly to be the obligation of the recipient governments and not of ourselves to see that these misinterpretations do not occur.

To those who come to us with requests for aid one would like to say: "You tell us, first, how you propose to assure that if we give you this aid it will not be interpreted among your people as a sign of weakness or fear on our part, or of a desire to dominate you."

These are not the only psychological dangers of foreign aid. There is the basic fact that any form of benevolence, if prolonged for any length of time (even in personal life this is true), comes to be taken for granted as a right and its withdrawal resented as an injury. There is the fact that any program of economic development represents a change in the terms of competition within a country and brings injury to some parties while it benefits the others. It is hard to aid any other country economically without its having an effect on internal political realities there—without its redounding to the benefit of one political party and the disadvantage of another.

All these considerations incline me to feel that, desirable as programs of foreign aid may sometimes be from the long-term standpoint, their im-

mediate psychological effects are apt to be at best mixed and uncertain. For this reason, foreign aid, as a general practice, cannot be regarded as a very promising device for combating, over the short term, the psychological handicaps under which Western statesmanship now rests in Asia and Africa.

Finally, I do not think for a moment that the Soviet Union really presents the alternative people seem to think it presents to a decent relationship with the West. Moscow has its contribution to make to what should be a common task of all the highly industrialized countries; and there is no reason why this contribution should not be welcomed wherever it can be helpful. But Moscow is not exactly the bottomless horn of plenty it is often held to be; and it is rather a pity that it has never been required to respond all at once to the many expectations directed to it. We ourselves should be the last, one would think, to wish to spare it this test. The results might be both healthy and instructive.

Eisenhower

(Continued from page 116)

ing a mighty military shield are hard, and tremendously costly. The tasks of patiently building a sound peace in a sound world are less costly, but even harder.

Americans have always shown a greatness of spirit and capacity of understanding equal to the demands of both war and peace. Americans will show these qualities now, and in the years to come.

Adlai E. Stevenson

I say, and I hope you agree, that the Soviet-Chinese bid by aid, trade, propaganda and subversion to win . . . uncommitted areas is far more dangerous than Soviet missiles or

Chinese man power just now. This is the hot war now, and we have been losing ground in the underdeveloped countries which Lenin and Stalin—and Khrushchev I suspect—believed to be the decisive steppingstones, first to the domination of Europe and ultimately the world. . . .

I would argue that at no time has the principle of foreign aid been of greater significance or more directly served the interests of the United States than it does today. For the full scale of the Communist challenge is only now becoming apparent—some \$2 billion of credits and grants, mostly for economic assistance, since 1955. In 1957 they sent over 2,000 technicians to 19 countries, 400 to India alone.

Last year, they brought more than 2,000 trainees to Communist countries for technical training. Much of this aid has gone to key countries—India, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Egypt and Syria. The purpose is obvious—to bring about economic dependence in strategic areas which will sooner or later lead to political subservience. . . .

I would hope that this conference might conclude that the primary problem is growth; that the threat of communism in the underdeveloped areas is less military than it is economic, political and moral; that the need in these critical areas is social and economic modernization. I believe a powerful and sound case can be made to Congress and the country for a program to promote economic and social health and self-reliance without military strings. And such a program should include, in my opinion, the following:

First, this year the full \$625 million requested should be appropriated to the Economic Development Fund, and next year the fund should be put on a permanent basis so that it can plan investments forward for

some years, not merely on a project basis, but in terms of the total requirements of the receiving nation. Our emphasis should be on loans, not gifts, where feasible. . . .

Second, we must make clear our support for the Indian Five-Year Plan on a long-term basis and enlist other nations to do likewise so that the Indians can proceed with reasonable confidence that they can achieve their essential objectives. India—twice the size of the Marshall Plan world—will need a sustained support to get over the hump. If we fail there, our cause will suffer grievously.

Third, we should explore methods of increasing private capital investment, although risk capital can't and won't begin to do the job of basic development—roads, power, transportation, schools, etc. But with strong government leadership and with a steady flow of government capital, private investment will have an enlarging role to play.

Fourth, we must learn to use our surpluses of food and fiber as a major constructive resource in economic development—not as charity, but as a working capital—to enable men to divert their labor from agriculture to roads, dams, power stations and the like without creating an inflationary demand for food and clothing. Our great agricultural productivity is a source of strength if we have the wit to use it.

Fifth, I think it is time we coordinated our economic affairs with our friends instead of all going it alone. The whole of the industrialized free world has the same interest in seeing the underdeveloped areas make the transition to self-sustaining growth while maintaining their independence. This is a global enterprise, and it should be organized on that basis. . . .

Sixth, against the background of an enlarged and stabilized American

program, weaving together the great resources of the industrialized nations, giving play to private as well

as government initiative, we could well invite Mr. Khrushchev to coordinate his efforts with ours if he is

really interested in the economic development and political independence of these less fortunate countries.



Can Spring Be Far Behind?

As predicted by *The Old Farmer's Almanac*, this has been a hard winter—not only in terms of sputniks and blizzards, but also in terms of anxiety about the economic recession. We may sometimes wonder how we shall ever dig out of snowdrifts and world troubles. Yet as the poet Shelley said, “If Winter comes, can Spring be far behind?” And on March 19 Pope Pius XII declared that the world is issuing from a “hard, long winter” and is about to enter “one of the most beautiful springtimes mankind has ever known,” preceding “one of the richest and most luminous summers.”

For those who are willing to look not only at portents of gloom, but also of hope, there are many signs that human beings, undeterred by the threat of nuclear destruction, are searching for new ideas, new ways of dealing with world problems. Here are four such signs:

1. *Support of UNEF.* The Charter of the United Nations, adopted in 1945, provides that member states of the international organization are to place at the disposal of the UN, through bilateral agreements, units of their troops and air forces for the creation of a collective security force. This provision has so far been a dead letter, due primarily to the inability of the great powers, which are members of the UN Military Committee — Britain, France, the United States and the U.S.S.R. — to agree on the types and number of armed units to be placed at the disposal of the UN.

In spite of this, as the result of a creative initiative by Lester B. Pearson, then foreign minister of Canada, the UN, following the Suez crisis, voted in 1956 to establish a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) for the purpose of policing the Sinai area between Egypt and Israel. This small force of 6,000 men recruited from ten nations in Europe, Asia and Latin America, with no participation by the great powers and financed by special contributions of UN members, is generally regarded as an outstanding success; and at the height of the Franco-Tunisian crisis over the bombing of a Tunisian village by French planes, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles suggested that perhaps a UN force might police the controversial Tunisian-Algerian border.

What is particularly interesting is that, according to a recent Gallup poll issued on March 11, American public opinion is solidly in favor of a standing UN army large enough to deal with any “brush-fire” wars around the globe. Of the persons polled, 66 percent think UNEF is a good idea; 15 percent, that it is a poor idea; and 19 percent have no opinion. Fifty-one percent favor increasing the UNEF to 100,000 men. To round out the picture, Harold E. Stassen, former special adviser on disarmament, has proposed that a UN force should be entrusted with nuclear weapons, presumably after they have been banned for use by the various nations which now possess them.

2. *The Monroney Plan.* In the

midst of widespread discussion about the challenge of Soviet economic aid to underdeveloped countries, given in the form of long-term loans at rates of interest lower than those usually set by the United States, Senator A. S. Mike Monroney, Democrat of Oklahoma, presented on February 22 a plan for a new international agency which would supplement the work of the World Bank.

This agency, to be called the International Development Association, would act as a sort of “poor land’s” banker, and would be ready to make long-term low-interest loans which the World Bank, limited by customary banking considerations, must now reject. According to Senator Monroney’s proposal, this agency would be capitalized with \$300 million supplied by the United States; \$700 million in “hard currencies” by other World Bank members; and an unspecified amount of nonconvertible local currencies, much of it supplied by the United States from sales of farm surpluses. One of the most important features of this agency is that it would accept repayment of loans in local currencies, thereby easing the problems of the underdeveloped countries, which are usually short of hard currencies such as the dollar, the pound sterling, the German mark and the Swiss franc.

Senator Monroney’s proposal has won the support of Eugene Black, president of the World Bank, and of Paul G. Hoffman, former Economic Cooperation Administrator, who said on March 18 that it would be tragic

if Congress did not promptly act on "the exciting proposal." Robert B. Anderson, Secretary of the Treasury, however, raised objections to the plan during three days of Senate hearings devoted to it in March. He said that what the underdeveloped countries needed most is not local currencies but, "imports of capital and other goods from abroad," and he raised the political point that "the national interest requires the capacity for bilateral financing." Mr. Hoffman agreed that some bilateral loans would continue to be necessary, but opposed "mixing political goals with economic goals."

3. *Food: America's "Secret Weapon"?* In connection with the Monroney plan, several Americans are beginning to point out that instead of trying to prevent what we call "food surpluses" we should grow more food rather than less and make this food available, through some mechanism as yet to be devised, to the peoples of the underdeveloped nations, which could thus be released from the specter of famine and have an opportunity to focus their energies on diversification of their hitherto backward agrarian economies. An eloquent plea to this effect has been made by Fred V. Heinkel, president of the Missouri Farmers' Association, in *The Missouri Farmer*.

He argues as follows: "The reason

this nation enjoys such a high standard of living is because the efficiency of agriculture has made it possible for almost 90 percent of our population to go about building cars and homes and providing other conveniences without a need to worry about food. In many nations of the world it is just the opposite—their problem lies in the fact that the bulk of their population is needed to produce food to keep people alive. We would provide them with food and release that manpower to build their industry and boost their standard of living. We could extend to the world the advantage which a highly productive and efficient agriculture has brought to America. Such an approach . . . would require the recognition of our productive abilities as a blessing rather than a problem." What we need is someone who will invent a workable mechanism to implement this approach.

4. *Medico*. Mr. Heinkel's idea involves both voluntary and governmental action. But another project for aid to underdeveloped countries has been established on a voluntary basis. This project, sponsored by the International Rescue Committee, is known as Medico, or Medical International Cooperation. Its objective, as described by Dr. Howard A. Rusk in *The New York Times*, is to send teams of physicians and medically

trained assistants into the underdeveloped areas; where they will build, equip and staff medical clinics and small hospitals. Medico, as Dr. Rusk points out, is a "people-to-people" concept carried out at the grass roots through a "physician-to-patient" program.

Under this project, inspired by Dr. Thomas A. Dooley, who during 1954-56 gave medical aid in a refugee camp in Vietnam, Medico-supported teams will train local personnel in remote village areas recommended by the host government. After 18 to 24 months, they will, without drawing, leaving behind all of their equipment and self-sufficient local staffs. Medico has already received contributions and pledges, principally from the American pharmaceutical industry, of more than half of the drugs and medical equipment initially needed, valued at \$500,000. It now seeks contributions of \$1 million from the American public and American industry.

Thus, supplementing governmental foreign policy programs, American citizens are thinking up new ideas on their own about world affairs. Underneath the dead leaves of blasted hopes and dessicated clichés are stirring fresh aspirations which hold promise of another springtime.

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In this issue:

What Are Nasser's Objectives?—G. G. Stevens	113
Dr. Libby's Earth-Shaking Story— N. Stanford	115
Should U.S. Continue Foreign Aid?— D. D. Eisenhower	116
G. F. Kennan	117
A. E. Stevenson	118
Can Spring Be Far Behind?—V. M. Dean	119

In the next issue:

A Foreign Policy Report—
The Future of Suez,
by Arch Parsons

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